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2Abstract
In the present study, we examined the effect of wins and losses on impulsive action in 
gambling (Experiments 1-3) and non-gambling tasks (Experiments 4-5). In each experiment, 
subjects performed a simple task in which they had to win points. On each trial, they had to 
choose between a gamble and a non-gamble. The gamble was always associated with a 
higher amount but a lower probability of winning than the non-gamble. After subjects 
indicated their choice (i.e. gamble or not), feedback was presented. They had to press a key 
to start the next trial. Experiments 1-3 showed that, compared to the non-gambling baseline, 
subjects were faster to initiate the next trial after a gambled loss, indicating that losses can 
induce impulsive actions. In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects alternated between the gambling 
task and a neutral decision-making task in which they could not win or lose points. Subjects 
were faster in the neutral decision-making task if they had just lost in the gambling task, 
suggesting that losses have a general effect on action. Our results challenge the dominant 
idea that humans become more cautious after suboptimal outcomes. Instead, they indicate 
that losses in the context of potential rewards are emotional events that increase impulsivity.
Keywords: cognitive control, gambling, impulsive action, sequential effects, emotion, 
approach motivation
3Scientists often attribute adaptive and goal-directed human behavior to a cognitive 
control system that organizes, monitors, and alters the settings of lower-level cognitive 
processes. This allows people to suppress or replace impulsive, habitual, or inappropriate 
actions. For example, cognitive control is required to quickly suppress prepotent actions 
when a stop or no-go signal is presented (Miyake et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof, van den 
Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Cognitive control is 
also required for responding with restraint (without completely suppressing all ongoing 
responses). For example, people slow down and respond more cautiously when they expect 
a stop signal to occur (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; for reviews, see e.g. Aron 2011; 
Stuphorn & Emeric, 2012). This slowing can be attributed to top-down control adjustments in 
attentional settings to enhance detection of the stop signal, and adjustments in response- or 
motor settings to prevent prevent premature responses (e.g. Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & 
Verbruggen, 2016). Similarly, the cognitive control system can attenuate motor activation in 
situations in which accurate responses are required (e.g. Forstmann et al., 2008) or when 
there is uncertainty about which action has to be selected (e.g. Frank, 2006). 
Many psychological theories assume that the cognitive control system also alters the 
settings of lower-level systems when people make an error or when outcomes are otherwise 
less desirable than anticipated (Egner 2008; Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014; 
Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). For example, people often slow down after they 
make an error (‘post-error slowing'; Laming 1968; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977; Rabbitt & 
Phillips, 1967). Such sequential effects have been observed in a variety of tasks, and are 
usually attributed to the cognitive control system: it monitors for errors (Alexander & Brown, 
2010; Brown & Braver, 2005; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007), the occurrence of conflict 
between choice options (Botvinick 2007; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004), or more generally, events that are worse than expected 
(Botvinick 2007; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, 
Schurger, & Cohen, 2004). When the control system detects such events, it adjusts the 
parameters of task-relevant processing pathways. These adjustments usually increase 
response latencies (i.e. people become more cautious) but can reduce the likelihood of 
further negative or suboptimal outcomes on subsequent trials (e.g. Dutilh et al., 2012; 
Purcell & Kiani, 2016). 
The present study examined sequential effects of wins and losses in a gambling task. 
Gambling is a recreational activity that many people engage in (e.g. 73% of the UK adult 
population; Wardle et al., 2011), but for a minority of people, it can turn into pathological or 
4problematic behavior, which may have serious adverse personal and social consequences 
(Clark & Limbrick-Oldfield, 2013; Potenza 2014). Problem gambling has been associated 
with impairments in cognitive control. For example, the control system may be required to 
regulate risk taking by suppressing superficially attractive but risky options (e.g. Billieux, 
Gay, Rochat, & Van der Linden, 2010; Cohen & Lieberman, 2010; Knoch et al., 2006; Trepel, 
Fox, & Poldrack, 2005; Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012). Cognitive control may also 
be required to adjust decision-making strategies after a loss or a suboptimal outcome, and 
failures to do so may contribute to the development of problematic behaviors, including 
problem gambling (Brown & Braver, 2008; Garavan & Stout, 2005; van Holst, van den Brink, 
Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2010). 
Cognitive control accounts predict decreased gambling after a loss than after a win. 
However, people often gamble more after a loss than after a win (Clark, 2010). Similar 
effects of negative outcomes on choice behavior have been observed in a variety of tasks 
and situations, including the stock market (e.g. Smith, Levere, Kurtzman, 2009; Imas, 2014). 
Many explanations have been proposed for such sequential effects (for a short review, see 
Smith et al., 2009). For example, according to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
the subjective value of an option can be influenced by immediately preceding gains and 
losses (Smith et al., 2009). This could explain why people gamble more after a loss than 
after a win, and attempt to recover previous losses.
Cognitive control accounts also predict slower responding (increased response caution) 
after a loss than after a win. By contrast, several gambling studies found that subjects were 
faster to initiate the next gamble after a loss than after a win (Corr & Thompson, 2014; 
Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999; Dixon et al., 2013; Shao, Read, Behrens, & Rogers, 2013; but 
see also Brevers et al., 2015; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & van den Brink, 2005). 
This finding indicates that negative outcomes in a gambling task can lead to impulsive (fast 
emotionally-charged) actions, and challenges the dominant idea that humans become more 
cautious after suboptimal outcomes. However, many gambling studies lack a proper 
baseline, so it is unclear if shorter response latencies after a loss than after a win are due to 
altered performance after a loss, altered performance after a win, or some combination of 
the two. In other words, without a baseline, we cannot be sure if the sequential effects of 
gambling are inconsistent with the cognitive control accounts. Another complicating factor is 
that the feedback after a win is usually different from feedback after a loss. For example, 
wins are often associated with extra sounds or additional visual stimuli (e.g. Delfabbro & 
Winefield, 1999; Dixon et al., 2013). The present study will control for these perceptual 
5factors and explore if and how outcomes in a gambling task influence initiation times on 
subsequent trials.
Overview of the experiments
In the present study, we examined how wins and losses influence impulsive action in 
both gambling (Experiments 1-3) and alternating non-gambling tasks (Experiments 4-5). 
Many judgment and decision-making studies have examined how gains and losses influence 
choice (see above). However, response latencies are often ignored in the judgment and 
decision-making literature, even though they can provide useful information about how 
people react to positive and negative events. Our main aim was to address this gap in the 
literature. Therefore, the present study focuses on response latencies. We will provide a 
general overview of the choice data after the final experiment, but an extensive overview of 
the very rich and extensive judgment and decision-making literature is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
In Experiment 1, we piloted our gambling task (Figure 1), which is similar to tasks that 
have been used to measure the neuro-cognitive correlates of decision-making under risk 
(e.g. De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Tymula et al., 2012), and the influence 
of emotion and motivation on economic choices (e.g. Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & 
Shizgal, 2001;  Ernst et al., 2004; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Wright, Morris, Guitart-
Masip, & Dolan, 2013). Subjects played a very simple game in which they had to win points. 
Each trial started with the presentation of an amount of points that was guaranteed if 
subjects decided not to gamble. This was followed by the presentation of a gamble, which 
was associated with a higher number of points, but the probability of winning the gamble 
was lower than 100%. After subjects indicated their choice (i.e. to gamble or not), we 
presented the outcome of the trial: After a gamble, feedback indicated whether subjects had 
won points (‘gambled win’) or not (‘gambled loss’); when subjects did not gamble, they kept 
the number of points shown at the beginning of the trial (i.e. the guaranteed amount 
associated with the non-gamble option). The non-gambling trials are our baseline to 
determine whether gambled losses, gambled wins, or both influenced action. Importantly, 
apart from the (inevitable) differences in amount, there were no perceptual differences in 
feedback between the various trial types (i.e. non-gamble, gambled loss, and gambled win). 
6Figure 1: An example of a trial in the gambling task. Each trial commenced with a start message. 
Then we presented two options successively for one second. The first option always represented a 
guaranteed amount of points that was awarded when subjects did not gamble. The second option 
always represented a higher amount, but here the probability of winning was less than 100% (the 
gamble). The exact probability of winning was indicated by the areas in the ‘pie chart’. The green area 
represented the probability that subjects could win the amount shown in the chart, and the red area 
represented the probability that they would get nothing. Then the options were presented together 
and subjects indicated whether they wanted to gamble or not by pressing the corresponding arrow 
key (there was no time limit). After subjects indicated their choice, feedback was presented for one 
second – in this example, the subject elected (successfully) to risk a certain 30 points on a 50:50 
gamble to win 60 points (see Method Section Experiment 1 for further details).
In Experiments 2a and 2b, we also acquired subjective ratings on half of the trials to 
further assess motivation and subjective beliefs (Clark et al., 2013). In Experiments 3a and 
3b, we manipulated the background of the screen to explore the stimulus- or context-
specificity of the sequential effects of losses and wins. Finally, Experiments 4-5 examined 
the effect of gambling on response latencies in a subsequent ‘neutral’ decision-making task 
in which subjects could not win or lose points. 
We measured the initiation time of the next trial (start reaction time; start RT) in each 
experiment. In other words, we examined how quickly subjects acted after a win or a loss. 
For completeness, we present an overview of the choice data at the end of the manuscript. 
7To summarize the main findings of the choice analysis: In all experiments, subjects gambled 
on approximately 50% of the trials (but there were large individual differences; see 
Supplementary Materials). Importantly, they gambled less after a gambled win than after a 
non-gamble, and the probability of gambling was highest after a gambled loss. These 
findings are consistent with previous studies (see above), and indicate that choice can be 
influenced by the outcome of the previous trial. The main question we address below is 
whether gambling outcomes also influenced impulsive action. 
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects. 20 students (8 males; age: M = 19.9 years, SD = 1.4) from the University of 
Exeter participated for monetary compensation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won 
in the gambling task (see below). Two subjects were replaced because they rarely gambled 
in the task; consequently, there were not enough trials (N < 5) for the sequential analyses. 
The subject exclusion criteria and target sample were determined before data collection, 
based on another pilot study (N=20) in which we found large effects of the outcome of a 
gamble on the start RT of the next trial (Cohen’s dz between .7 and 1.2). All experiments of 
the present study were approved by the local research ethics committee at the School of 
Psychology, University of Exeter. Written informed consent was obtained after the nature 
and possible consequences of the studies were explained. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiments were run on a 21.5-inch iMac using 
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). We used a standard QWERTY keyboard for response 
registration. On each trial, two choice options were represented by pie charts (diameter: 5 
cm) containing a certain amount of points (Figure 1). The first option always represented an 
amount of points that was guaranteed if subjects decided not to gamble. The second option 
always represented the gamble. If selected, subjects could risk the guaranteed amount to 
win a higher amount of points; however, the probability of winning the higher amount was 
always less than 100%. The exact probability of winning was indicated by the areas of the 
pie chart. A green (RGB: 0 127 0) area represented the probability that subjects could win 
the amount shown in the pie chart; a red (RGB: 127 0 0) area represented the probability 
that they would get nothing. Thus, the larger the green area, the higher the probability of 
winning. The red segment was always on the left within the ‘gamble’ pie (Figure 1). The 
options were presented against a white background (RGB: 255 255 255). The amounts 
8appeared in the center of the green area of the pie chart (font: Arial; font size: 30; font color: 
white). 
The amounts and the gambles were randomized across trials: the amount associated 
with the non-gamble (i.e. the guaranteed amount) varied between 20 and 50 (i.e. 20, 30, 40, 
50), and the amount associated with the gamble was 1.5, 2, 3, or 4 times higher than the 
guaranteed amount. This resulted in 16 possible combinations (see Appendix A). The 
probability of winning the gamble varied between .25 and .66 (i.e. .25, .33, .50, .66), and was 
adjusted to keep the expected value of the gamble and the non-gamble the same (e.g. when 
the guaranteed amount for the non-gamble was 50, and the gamble was 200, then the 
probability of winning the gamble was .25; 50 = .25 x 200; see Appendix A).
Procedure. Figure 1 gives an overview of the trial structure. Each trial commenced with 
the message ‘Press a key to start the next trial’. After subjects had pressed any key of the 
keyboard and 500 ms had elapsed since the presentation of the message1, the guaranteed 
amount associated with the non-gamble was presented in a green pie chart. Then the 
gamble was presented in a red-and-green pie chart. Both pie charts were presented in the 
center of the screen for one second. After they had been presented separately, subjects saw 
them again together (one on the left and one on the right of the screen; distance between 
the two options: 5 cm). At this point, they had to decide whether they wanted to gamble or 
not by pressing the left- or right-arrow key of the keyboard for the left or right option, 
respectively (see Figure 1). At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were informed that 
they were guaranteed to earn points if they did not gamble. There was no time out during the 
choice phase. Left and right arrows were presented below the options to remind subjects 
that they could respond only at this stage, and they were told at the beginning of the 
experiment that they could use the index and middle finger of their right hand to press the 
keys. The location of the non-gamble and gamble options (i.e. left or right of the center of the 
screen) was randomized across trials.
After subjects selected an option, the computer showed the outcome of their choice. If 
they had selected the gamble, the computer indicated whether they had won the points 
indicated in the pie chart (gambled win; e.g. ‘OUTCOME = 200 points’) or not (gambled loss; 
‘OUTCOME = 0 points’). To determine the outcome of a gamble, the computer selected a 
random number between 0 and 1 on each trial, and subjects had won the gamble if the 
1 In future experiments, we plan to measure EEG when subjects are performing the task. To avoid 
overlap between visual components associated with the different perceptual events, the minimum 
delay between the start message and the presentation of the first option was 500 ms. 
9selected number was smaller than p(win). If they had selected the non-gambling option, 
subjects always received the guaranteed amount shown at the beginning of the trial (e.g. 
‘OUTCOME = 50 points’). Finally, an error message was presented if subjects pressed an 
incorrect key (‘Incorrect response. Use the left and right arrow keys.'); they did not get any 
points on such trials. After 1 second, the next trial started with the ‘Press a key to start the 
next trial’ screen. 
To ensure that there were enough trials for the sequential analyses, the gambling task 
consisted of 256 trials. For most subjects, the experiment lasted 20-30 minutes. Subjects 
were told that if they wished to do so, they could take a short ‘mini-break’ between trials as 
there were no fixed breaks after a set number of trials. Consistent with previous research 
(e.g. Tymula et al, 2012), we made choices consequential: At the end of the experiment, the 
computer randomly selected the outcomes of 10 trials. The sum of these were converted 
into real money: for every 100 points, subjects got £1 extra. The maximum additional payout 
was £5 (range: £0-5). Subjects were informed about the pay-off structure at the beginning of 
the experiment.
Analysis. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R Development 
Core Team, 2014). All raw data files and R scripts used for the analyses are deposited on 
the Open Research Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17260). 
In the sequential analyses, we distinguished between trials that followed a non-gamble 
(our baseline), trials that followed a ‘gambled’ win, and trials that followed a ‘gambled’ loss. 
For each trial type, we calculated how quickly subjects started the next trial (start RT). Due 
to the pay-off manipulation (i.e. at the end of the experiment, the computer randomly 
selected the outcome of 10 trials), points did not accumulate over the course of the 
experiment. Therefore, we did not control for overall accumulation of points in the analyses, 
but we show in Supplementary Materials that the effect of trial outcome on start RT was 
similar in the first and second half of the experiment. Because some subjects did not gamble 
often, we could not explore whether a loss or win occurred in a context of doing well or in a 
context of doing poorly (see e.g. Mellers, 2000, p. 915).
We excluded trials on which start RT was above 5,000 ms or the latency of the choice 
response (i.e. the left/right arrow response) was above 2,500 ms, trials on which subjects 
pressed an incorrect key, and trials that followed such incorrect trials. This resulted in a data 
exclusion of 2.6%. The trial exclusion criteria were determined before data collection. The 
analyses focused on the effect of the outcome of the previous trial; therefore, we also 
excluded the first trial of the experiment. Note that follow-up tests revealed that results did 
10
not change much when we used a stricter cut-off for start RT (2,500 ms instead of 5,000 
ms). Furthermore, the RT pattern was very similar when median RTs were analyzed instead 
of means.
Inferential statistics appear in Table 1. We performed paired t-tests to contrast the trial 
types, but we show an overview of the corresponding univariate analyses in Appendix B. For 
the pairwise comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure (Lakens, 2013).
Results and Discussion
Start RTs were influenced by the outcome of the previous trial: subjects started the next 
trial sooner after a gambled loss (M = 485 ms; SD = 146) than after a gambled win (M = 573 
ms; SD = 198) or a non-gamble (M = 669; SD = 195); both ps < .01 (Table 1). The difference 
between trials following a gambled win and trials following a non-gamble was also 
statistically significant, p < .01. Thus, compared to a non-gambling baseline, gambling on the 
previous trial generally shortened start RT. Engaging with stimuli that are inconsistently 
associated with reward (i.e. the gambling option) may temporarily boost dopamine and 
induce a motivational ‘approach’ state (Robinson et al., 2014). Most importantly, this effect 
was largest after a loss, suggesting that losing points can induce impulsive actions. This 
finding appears inconsistent with the cognitive control account, which predicts that people 
should become more cautious (i.e. less impulsive) after a gambled loss than after gambled 
win or a non-gamble. However, it is possible that subjects started the next trial sooner after a 
loss than after a win because they believed their chances of winning had increased (i.e. the 
gamblers fallacy). This account is not necessarily inconsistent with the cognitive control 
account, as it assumes that behavior can be regulated by expectancies about future events; 
this can happen even when these expectancies or beliefs are incorrect. We explored this 
idea in Experiment 2.
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Table 1: Overview of planned comparisons to explore the effect of the previous gamble on the start 
RT of the gambling task in Experiments 1-5. Experiment 1, df = 19; Experiments 2-5, df = 39.
Note Table 1: The Bayes factor (BF) is an odds ratio: It is the probability of the data under one 
hypothesis relative to that under another. Evidence categories for Bayes Factor: BF < .33 = 
Substantial evidence for H0 ; 1/3–1 = Anecdotal evidence for H0; 1 = No evidence; 1–3 = Anecdotal 
evidence for HA; 3–10 = Substantial evidence for HA; BF > 10 = strong to decisive evidence for HA. H0 
= no difference between the trial types; HA = a difference between the trial types. We calculated the 
Bayes factors with the BayesFactor package in R, using the default prior (0.707).
Experiments 2a and 2b
Experiment 1 indicates that the outcome of a gamble can influence start RT. In 
Experiment 2, we further explored the origins of this effect. To examine the motivational 
consequences of gambling and subjects’ beliefs about upcoming events, on half of the trials 
we asked them to indicate whether they agreed with the following two statements: ‘I was 
pleased with the outcome of the previous trial’; and 'I think my chances of winning on the 
next trial have increased' (for a similar procedure, see e.g. Clark et al., 2013). These 
statements were presented after the feedback stage (the previous trial) but before the new 
choice options appeared (the next trial). To allow a direct comparison with Experiment 1, 
subjects had to press a key to continue the experiment after each feedback screen.
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
diff
184
96
-87
67
28
-39
160
49
-111
48
-33
-81
28
12
-16
lower 
CI
141
48
-132
42
-1
-68
121
1
-170
26
-56
-111
-7
-14
-50
upper 
CI
227
145
-42
92
57
-9
199
97
-52
69
-10
-51
62
37
19
t
8.905
4.181
-4.080
5.376
1.936
-2.662
8.321
2.080
-3.819
4.453
-2.952
-5.517
1.616
0.938
-0.930
p
< .001
.001
.001
< .001
.060
.011
< .001
.044
< .001
< .001
.005
< .001
.114
.354
.358
gav
1.057
0.482
0.498
0.482
0.184
0.265
0.895
0.231
0.529
0.306
0.205
0.522
0.112
0.048
0.065
BF
4.15 x 105
66.17
54.10
4913
0.92
3.69
3.04 x 107
1.18
60.15
340.50
7.02
7459
0.56
0.26
0.26
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Method
Subjects. 40 new students (Experiment 2a: N = 20; Experiment 2b: N = 20; 6 males, 
age: M = 19.6 years, SD= 2.0) from the University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the gambling task. One 
subject was replaced in Experiment 2b because they rarely gambled in the task (see 
Experiment 1). 
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analysis. These were the same as in Experiment 
1 except for the following: In both experiments, responses were registered with a gaming 
mouse (Razor Deathadder). Each trial started with a message ‘Click to continue’. The trial 
continued when the subject clicked one of the mouse buttons. On half of the trials (no-rating 
trials), the gambling task started immediately; on the other half (rating trials), subjects had 
rate two statements first. The first statement was always ‘I was pleased with the outcome of 
the previous trial (X points)’ (X = number of points the subject had won). The second 
statement was always 'I think my chances of winning on the next trial have increased'. The 
statements appeared in the center of the screen (font: Arial 24). Subjects indicated the 
extent to which they agreed with the statements by clicking with the mouse on a visual 
analog scale (10 cm) that appeared below the statement. The scale ranged from 0 (‘Not at 
all’) to 100 (‘Very much'). The gambling task started immediately after the second rating 
response. The order of rating and no-rating trials was fully randomized at the beginning of 
the experiment (i.e. it was not influenced by the subject’s choices or outcomes of the 
gambles). 
In Experiment 2a, we immediately presented the two choice options together in the 
gambling task, and subjects could select one of them by clicking with the mouse on the 
preferred option. A preliminary analysis of this experiment showed that the effect of gambling 
outcome on choice interacted with the rating manipulation (see Supplementary Materials). 
To determine whether this was due to the actual rating or to some stimulus-presentation 
artifact, we ran a second version (Experiment 2b) in which we used the presentation mode 
of Experiment 1 (i.e. the two options were first presented successively for one second, and 
then they were presented together). Initial analyses showed that Experiment did not interact 
significantly with the effect of trial outcome. Therefore, we collapsed the data of Experiments 
2a and 2b.
For the analyses, we used the same trial exclusion criteria as Experiment 1. This 
resulted in a data reduction of 11% in Experiment 2a and 4% in Experiment 2b (because the 
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options were immediately presented together in Experiment 2a, choice latencies were longer 
than the choice latencies in Experiments 1 and 2b). 
Results and Discussion
Start RTs. Subjects executed the start response before the statements were presented; 
therefore, we collapsed the data of rating and no-rating trials for the start RT analysis. The 
start RT data were consistent with Experiment 1: subjects started the next trial sooner after a 
gambled loss (M = 416 ms; SD = 132) than after a non-gamble (M = 483 ms; SD = 142) or a 
gambled win (M = 455 ms; SD = 158); both ps < .012 (Table 1). The difference between 
trials following a non-gamble and trials following a gambled win was marginally significant 
(two-tailed p = .06; one-tailed: p = .03). 
Ratings. The rating for the ‘pleased with outcome’ statement was influenced by the 
outcome of the previous trial, F(2,78) = 213.5, p < 0.001, η2gen = 0.771. Subjects were more 
pleased with the outcome of the previous trial after a gambled win (M = 73, SD = 14) than 
after a non-gamble (M = 47; SD = 14) or a gambled loss (M = 16; SD = 11); all differences 
were statistically significant (ps < .001). 
The rating for the ‘increased chances of winning’ statement was also influenced by the 
outcome of the previous trial, F(2,78) = 15.9, p < 0.001, η2gen = 0.052. Subjects thought that 
their chances of winning on the next trial had increased more after a gambled win (M = 39, 
SD = 23) than after a non-gamble (M = 35, SD = 21) or a gambled loss (M = 28, SD = 18), 
which is consistent with the findings of Clark et al. (2013). All differences were statistically 
significant (ps < .015). In other words, we observed a ‘hot hand’ effect (i.e. subjects expected 
another win after a gambled win more than after a gambled loss; Ayton & Fischer, 2004) 
rather than a gambler’s fallacy (i.e. the fallacious belief that a run of independent events 
must be broken). It is possible that the gamblers fallacy influences behavior primarily after 
longer runs of wins/losses (Ayton & Fischer, 2004); unfortunately, we could not test this idea 
in Experiment 2 because we did not have enough observations for the various run lengths 
for each subject.
The association between start RT and the ratings. For each subject and statement, 
we calculated the median rating as a function of the outcome of the previous trial; then we 
calculated start RT for trials with a rating lower or equal to the corresponding median rating 
and trials with a rating higher than the corresponding median rating. Six subjects were 
excluded from these analyses because there were not enough trials for all cells (i.e. N < 5). 
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For both statements, we analyzed start RT with a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
outcome of the previous trial (non-gamble, gambled loss, gambled win) and rating (rating ≤ 
Md vs. rating > Md) as within-subjects factors. The descriptive statistics appear in Table 2. 
As discussed above, start RT was influenced by the outcome of the previous trial, but the 
median split analyses did not reveal other significant effects (see Table B2 in Appendix B). 
Discussion. Consistent with Experiment 1, we found that start RT was shorter after a 
gambled loss than after a non-gamble (the baseline) or a gambled win. Furthermore, the 
rating analyses revealed a ‘hot hand’ effect rather than a gamblers fallacy. Thus, the findings 
of Experiment 2 are inconsistent with the cognitive control accounts discussed in the 
Introduction. According to these accounts, people should become more cautious after a 
negative or suboptimal outcome. However, our findings indicate that losing led to impulsive 
actions, rather than cautious actions.
Table 2: Overview of the ratings and mean start RT as a function of the median split (rating is ≤ 
median rating or > median rating) and the preceding gambling trial in Experiment 2. (Standard 
deviation between brackets).
Experiments 3a and 3b
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that performance in our gambling task is 
influenced by the outcome of the previous trial. Work in other domains indicates that 
sequential effects are often modulated by repetition of information from the previous trial. For 
example, congruency sequence effects (i.e. a reduction in conflict when conflict also 
occurred on the preceding trial; Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014; 
Egner, 2008) and other sequential effects (e.g. Henson, Eckstein, Waszak, Frings, & Horner, 
2014; Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren,2014) are partly due to the retrieval 
of stimulus-specific associations from memory (e.g. stimulus-response or stimulus-outcome 
associations). Even task contexts may become associated with a particular response or 
Pleased with the 
outcome
Increased chances 
of winning
Rating
Start RT
Rating
Start RT
Non-gamble
≤ Md
37 (16)
487 (168)
29 (17)
483 (175)
> Md
57 (12)
505 (181)
46 (19)
506 (171)
Loss
≤ Md
10 (8)
397 (132)
20 (16)
395 (130)
> Md
26 (15)
415 (136)
40(19)
420 (138)
Gambled win
≤ Md
58 (16)
456 (200)
34(20)
450 (176)
> Md
83 (12)
443 (148)
53(23)
444 (173)
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outcome (Perruchet, 2015) and influence subsequent performance (e.g. Bouton, 2004; 
Redish, Jensen, Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, 2007). Therefore, Experiments 3a and 3b 
examined whether the sequential effects of winning and losing were also modulated by the 
repetition of stimulus information.
Method
Subjects. 40 new students (Experiment 3a: N = 20; Experiment 3b: N = 20; 17 males; 
age: M = 19.4 years, SD = 1.3) from the University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the gambling task. Three 
subjects (one in Experiment 3a and two in Experiment 3b) were replaced because they 
rarely gambled (see Experiment 1).
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analyses. These were the same as in 
Experiment 1 except for the following: The background of the screen (i.e. the wallpaper) was 
a high-resolution jpeg image of a casino building. There were two images (one of the 
‘Bellagio’ and one of the ‘Venetian’; both are casinos in Las Vegas, USA). Image order was 
randomized; consequently, on approximately half of the trials, the image changed. In both 
experiments, the image of the casino was presented throughout the whole trial (i.e. from the 
‘Press a key to start the next trial’ screen to the ‘Outcome’ screen; see Figure 1). In 
Experiment 3b, we introduced a short intertrial interval (500 ms), during which a high-
resolution image of the famous Las Vegas Strip served as background.
For the analysis, we used the trial exclusion criteria of Experiment 1. This resulted in a 
data reduction of 3.2% in Experiment 3a and 3.9% in Experiment 3b. The ITI manipulation 
did not influence performance significantly, so we collapsed the data of Experiments 3a and 
3b in the analyses reported below. 
Results and Discussion
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, subjects started the next trial sooner after a 
gambled loss (M = 612 ms; SD = 204) than after a gambled win (M = 723 ms; SD = 269) or 
a non-gamble (M = 772 ms; SD = 197); both ps < .001 (Table 1). The difference between 
trials following gambled wins and trials following non-gambles was also statistically 
significant (Table 1). Repetition or alternation of the ‘casino’ background did not significantly 
influence start RTs (ps > .17; Appendix B)2. Possibly, subjects did not pay enough attention 
2 For casino repetition trials, start RT was 596 ms (SD = 181) after a gambled loss; 707 ms (SD = 
250) after a gambled win; and 755 ms (SD = 180) after a non-gamble. For casino-alternation trials, 
start RT was 628 ms (SD = 225) after a gambled loss; 739 ms (SD = 288) after a gambled win; and 
789 ms (SD = 213) after a non-gamble. 
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to the background image, which could have influenced the learning and the retrieval of the 
relevant associations (e.g. Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, & Verbruggen, 2016). 
Alternatively, the sequential effects of wins and losses may not be stimulus- or context-
dependent. We will further explore the latter possibility in Experiments 4-5. 
Experiments 4a and 4b
In Experiments 1-3, start RTs were consistently shorter after a gambled loss than after 
a non-gamble, suggesting that losing in our gambling task induces impulsive actions. As 
indicated in the Introduction of Experiments 3a-b, many sequential effects are task or 
context-dependent and they do not necessarily transfer from one task to another (Braem, 
Abrahamse, Duthoo, & Notebaert, 2014). To further explore the generality of the sequential 
effects of gambling, we used a task-switching manipulation in Experiments 4a and 4b: 
subjects alternated between the gambling task in which they could win or lose points and a 
perceptual decision-making task in which they could not win or lose points.
Method
Subjects. 40 new students (Experiment 4a: N = 20; Experiment 4b: N = 20; males: 11; 
age: M = 19.8 years, SD = 1.5) from the University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the gambling task. One 
subject in Experiment 4a was replaced because they rarely gambled (see Experiment 1). 
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. Subjects continuously alternated between the 
gambling task and a perceptual decision-making task (in other words, every trial was a task 
switch; Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). The gambling 
task was the same as in Experiment 1, apart from the following: every gambling trial started 
with the message ‘Press a key to start the next "choice" trial’.
In the perceptual decision-making task, each trial started with the message ‘Press a key 
to start the next "dark vs. light" trial'. Immediately after subjects had pressed a key, a grey 
circle (diameter: 5 cm) was presented in the center of the screen against a white 
background. Subjects had to decide whether it was dark (RGB < 127 127 127) or light (RGB 
> 127 127 127), by pressing the left or right arrow key, respectively. They were instructed to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. The circle remained on the screen until a 
response was executed. Feedback about performance (‘Correct response’ or ‘Incorrect 
response’) was presented for 1 second after every trial. 
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In Experiment 4a, the difficulty level was continuously adjusted using a two-up/one-
down tracking procedure to obtain an error probability of approximately .30 (Leek, 2001). 
After two correct trials, the RGB difference between dark (e.g. RGB: 120 120 120) and light 
(e.g. RGB: 134 134 134) was reduced (e.g. RGB: 123 123 123 vs. RGB: 131 131 131), 
making the discrimination more difficult. The RGB difference increased after each incorrect 
trial, making the discrimination easier again. To determine whether sequential effects were 
influenced by overall error rate in the perceptual decision-making task, we made the task 
slightly easier in Experiment 4b. More specifically, the difficulty level was adjusted using a 
three-up/one-down tracking procedure to obtain an error probability of approximately .20: the 
RGB difference was reduced after every three correct trials, but increased after every 
incorrect trial. 
Analysis. Subjects continuously alternated between the gambling task and the 
decision-making task. This influenced our exclusion criteria. In the gambling task, we 
excluded trials on which start RT was above 5,000 ms or choice RT was above 2,500 ms, 
and gambling trials on which subjects pressed a key that was not part of the response set 
(i.e. incorrect gambling trials). We also excluded gambling trials that were preceded by an 
incorrect gambling trial (i.e. when trial n-2 was an incorrect gambling trial). We did not 
exclude gambling trials that were preceded by an incorrect decision-making response (trial 
n-1) as there were enough incorrect responses in the perceptual decision-making task for a 
sequential analysis. In the perceptual decision-making task, we excluded trials that followed 
an excluded gambling trial (trial n-1), trials on which start RT was above 5,000 ms, and trials 
on which response latency was above 2,500 ms. This resulted in a data reduction of 3.8% in 
Experiment 4a and 4.6% in Experiment 4b. Experiment did not interact with the effects of the 
outcome of the previous trial, so we collapsed the data of the two experiments in the 
analyses reported below. For the analysis of choice latencies in the perceptual decision-
making task, we included only trials on which subjects responded correctly to the grey circle. 
Results and Discussion
Performance in the perceptual decision-making task. Consistent with the gambling 
experiments, subjects started the perceptual decision-making task sooner after a gambled 
loss (M = 465 ms, SD = 161) than after a gambled win (M = 575 ms; SD = 195) or a non-
gamble (M = 605 ms; SD = 185); both ps < .01 (Table 3). The numerical start RT difference 
between trials that followed a non-gamble and trials that followed a gambled win was not 
statistically significant (Table 3).
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In the perceptual decision-making task, subjects responded faster to the grey circle 
after a gambled loss (M = 903, SD = 193) than after a gambled win (M = 951 ms, SD = 196) 
or a non-gamble (M = 939 ms, SD = 177); both ps < .029 (Table 3). The choice latency 
difference between trials that followed a non-gamble and trials that followed a gambled win 
was not statistically significant (Table 3). Combined, the start RTs and choice latencies 
indicate that losses can have a ‘general’ effect on impulsive action (i.e. faster responses). 
Finally, we analyzed the proportion of correct trials in the perceptual decision-making 
task. The small numerical accuracy differences between trials following a loss (M = .699, SD 
= .076), a gambled win (M = .712, SD = .107), and a non-gamble (M = .712, SD = .052) were 
not statistically significant (Table 3 and Appendix B). 
Performance in the gambling task. Subjects alternated between the gambling task 
and the perceptual decision-making task. We tested whether the outcome of the previous 
gambling trial (i.e. trial n-2) still influenced performance on the current gambling trial (despite 
the intervening perceptual decision-making trial). For completeness, we also tested whether 
gambling performance was influenced by the immediately preceding perceptual decision-
making trial (i.e. trial n-1); we present these analyses in Supplementary Materials. 
The outcome of a last gambling trial (trial n-2) still influenced performance on the 
current gambling trial. Start RT was shorter after a gambled loss (M = 524; SD = 146) than 
after a gambled win (M = 605; SD = 160) or a non-gamble (M = 572; SD = 161); both ps < .
001 (Table 1). Thus, doing a non-gambling task between two successive gambles did not 
influence the effect of losses much. However, the intervening task influenced the difference 
between gambled wins and non-gambles. In Experiments 1-3, starts RTs were shorter after 
a gambled win than after a non-gamble. In this experiment, start RT was longer when trial 
n-2 was a gambled win compared with a non-gamble (Table 1). 
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Table 3: Overview of planned comparisons to further explore the effect of the previous gamble on 
performance in the perceptual decision-making (PDM) task of Experiment 4 and the go task of 
Experiment 5. For all comparisons, df = 39. 
Experiment 5
Experiments 4a and 4b showed that losing a gamble can influence performance in a 
seemingly unrelated perceptual decision-making task. In other words, losses generally 
induce faster responses on subsequent trials (whatever the nature of that trial). Furthermore, 
we found that performing a difficult discrimination task did not modulate the effect of losses 
on start RT in the gambling task much. These findings are remarkable, and could indicate 
that cognitive control processes have little influence on loss-induced impulsivity. Therefore, 
we explored in Experiment 5 whether the effect of losses on response latencies was also 
observed in a task in which subjects typically respond with caution. More specifically, 
subjects alternated between the gambling task and a stop-signal task (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008). As discussed in the Introduction, many studies have shown that people slow down 
and respond more cautiously when they expect a stop signal to occur. Therefore, 
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Start RT
Go accuracy
Go RT
Start RT
Go accuracy
Go RT
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled Loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled Loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled Loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled Loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled Loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled Loss vs Gambled win
diff
140
30
-110
0.013
0.000
-0.013
35
-13
-48
118
9
-109
.021
-.006
-.027
12
14
2
lower 
CI
111
-11
-138
-0.011
-0.034
-0.047
4
-37
-76
75
-31
-147
.002
-.026
-.046
-5
-3
-14
upper 
CI
168
71
-81
0.037
0.034
0.022
67
12
-21
161
49
-72
.039
.014
-.007
30
31
17
t
9.872
1.485
-7.805
1.102
0.022
-0.746
2.284
-1.043
-3.525
5.544
0.456
-5.900
2.240
-0.611
-2.744
1.423
1.711
0.247
p
< .001
.146
< .001
.277
.983
.460
.028
.303
.001
< .001
.651
< .001
.031
.545
.009
.163
.095
.806
gav
0.798
0.156
0.611
0.201
0.005
0.137
0.190
0.067
0.245
0.450
0.032
0.370
0.318
0.089
0.346
0.070
0.081
0.011
BF
2.38 x 109
0.47
6.77 x 106
0.30
0.17
0.22
1.72
0.28
28.07
8073
0.19
23318
1.58
0.20
4.41
0.432
0.646
0.176
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Experiment 5 explored whether a loss in the gambling task could influence response 
latencies in the stop-signal task as well. 
Method
Subjects. 40 new students (11 males; age: M = 19.9 years, SD = 2.5) from the 
University of Exeter participated for monetary compensation (£5) or partial course credit, 
plus money won in the gambling task. One subject was replaced because they rarely 
gambled (see Experiment 1), and two subjects were replaced because p(correct) in the stop-
signal task was below .80 .
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. Subjects continuously alternated between the 
gambling task and a stop-signal task (in other words, every trial was a task switch). The 
gambling task was the same as in Experiment 4.
In the stop-signal task, each trial started with the message ‘Press a key to start the next 
"dark vs. light" trial'. Immediately after subjects had pressed a key, a grey circle (diameter: 5 
cm) was presented in the center of the screen against a white background. Subjects had to 
decide whether it was dark (RGB: 88 88 88) or light (RGB: 167 167 167) by pressing the left 
or right arrow key, respectively. The circle remained on the screen for 1,500 ms, regardless 
of RT. On 25% of the trials (stop-signal trials), the circle turned blue (RGB: 0 150 255) after a 
variable delay, instructing the subjects to withhold their response. The stop-signal delay 
(SSD) was initially set at 500 ms, and continuously adjusted according to a one-up/one-
down tracking procedure to obtain a probability of stopping of .50: SSD decreased by 50 ms 
when a subject responded on a stop-signal trial, but increased by 50 ms when they 
successfully stopped (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b).
Analyses. For the gambling task, we used the same exclusion criteria as in Experiment 
4. In the stop-signal task, we excluded trials that followed an excluded gambling trial and 
trials on which start RT was above 5,000 ms, which resulted in a data reduction of 2.5%. For 
the analysis of go latencies in the stop-signal task, we included only trials on which subjects 
responded correctly to the grey circle. There were not enough stop-signal trials to examine 
the effect of the gambling outcome on stop performance3.
Results and Discussion
Go performance in the stop-signal task. Subjects started the stop-signal task sooner 
after a gambled loss (M = 633 ms, SD = 266) than after a gambled win (M = 742, SD = 318) 
3 This would require hundreds of signal trials as the outcome of the previous trial cannot be predicted 
and some subjects do not gamble very often.
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or a non-gamble (M = 751 ms, SD = 254); both ps < .01 (Table 3). The numerical difference 
between trials that followed a non-gamble and trials that followed a gambled win was not 
statistically significant (Table 3). 
Go accuracy was lower after a gambled loss (M = .905, SD = .073) than after a non-
gamble (M = .926, SD = .055) or a gambled win (M = .932, SD = .080); both ps < .032 (Table 
3). Go latencies (i.e. once the stop-signal task had been initiated) were similar for trials 
following a loss (M = 725 ms, SD = 176), a non-gamble (M = 737, SD = 168), and a gambled 
win (M = 723, SD = 177); none of the numerical differences were statistically significant 
(Table 3). This finding suggests that proactive control adjustments can partly counteract 
loss-induced impulsivity. The absence of a go latency difference indicates the go accuracy 
difference is not due to a simple speed/accuracy trade-off in the stop task itself. However, it 
is possible that by starting the next trial sooner after a loss, subjects were less prepared, 
resulting in lower accuracy. 
Performance in the gambling task. We explored whether the outcome of the last 
gambling trial (trial n-2) still influenced performance on the current gambling trial (trial n), 
despite the intervening stop-signal task (trial n-1). Start RT was 720 ms (SD = 247) after a 
gambled loss, 736 ms (SD = 240) after a gambled win, and 748 ms (SD = 242) after a non-
gamble. However, the individual contrasts were no longer significant (Table 1). Thus, 
performing a cognitive control tasks in which people are usually cautious attenuated loss-
induced impulsivity. 
Combined analysis start latencies
The results of Experiments 1-5 indicate that gambled losses and wins affect start RTs 
on the next trial. Before we discuss the implications of these findings, we report the outcome 
of a two extra analyses. 
First, we explored whether the effect of gambled wins and losses was influenced by the 
probability of winning and the amount of the previous gamble. As discussed in the Method 
Section of Experiment 1, the amount subjects could win when they gambled increased when 
probability of winning decreased (and vice versa; see Appendix A). To obtain sufficient 
observations for this analyses (N >= 5 for each cell), we collapsed trials for which p(win) of 
the previous gamble option was .67 and .50 [i.e. a relatively ‘high’ p(win) but lower amount], 
and trials for which p(win) of the previous gamble option was .25 or .33 [i.e. lower p(win) but 
higher amount]. The corresponding amounts are shown in Appendix A. Because some 
subjects only gambled when p(win) was either high or low, we had to exclude 43 subjects 
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(leaving 137 subjects for the analyses reported below). Start RT was analyzed by means of 
a 3 (outcome previous trial: non-gamble, gambled loss, gambled win) by 2 (p(win) of the 
gamble option of the previous trial: high or low) repeated measures ANOVA.
Figure 2: Start RT as a function of the outcome of the previous trial and p(win) and amount of the 
previous gamble (When probability of winning was low, the amount was always high; see Appendix 
A). The error bars reflect within-subject confidence intervals (Morey, 2008). Note that we observed a 
similar numerical pattern when all subjects were included; however, we could not perform univariate 
analyses when all subjects were included because of missing cells.
Figure 2 shows that the effect of a gambled loss on start RT of the next trial was more 
pronounced when the probability of winning the gamble was low (and therefore the potential 
win was a large amount). The interaction between trial outcome and probability of winning 
was significant, F(2,272) = 5.457, p = .005, η2gen = 0.002. A follow-up t-test revealed that start 
RT after a gambled loss was shorter when the gamble was associated with a low p(win) but 
high amount, compared to when it was associated with a higher p(win) but a lower amount; 
t(136) = 2.91, p = .004, gav = .164, BF = 5.35. Start RTs after a non-gamble or a gambled win 
were not modulated much by p(win) of the previous trial (both ps > .148; furthermore, 
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Bayesian analyses provided substantial support for the null hypothesis, BFs < 0.27). We 
discuss the implications of this finding in the General Discussion. Note that in this combined 
analysis, the main effect of trial outcome is similar to the effects observed in Experiments 
1-5; thus, the exclusion of 43 subjects did not alter the overall data pattern much.
Second, we analyzed the difference between start RT of the current trial (trial n) and 
start RT of the immediately preceding trial (trial n-1). Measurements of post-error slowing 
can be contaminated by global fluctuations in performance over the course of an 
experiment. For example, when subjects are temporarily distracted, they are more likely to 
make an error and average RT is likely to be higher. However, this will influence the 
measurement of post-error slowing because ‘post-error trials’ are more likely to come from 
blocks in which the subject was distracted (hence RT was long) than from blocks in which 
the subject was focused (hence RT was short). There is a solution for this problem: post-
error slowing can be quantified as the RT difference between the post-error trial and the 
associated pre-error trial (e.g. Dutilh, van Ravenzwaaij, et al., 2012). Similar solutions have 
been proposed to control for global fluctuations in other paradigms (e.g. Nelson, Boucher, 
Logan, Palmeri, & Schall, 2010).
It is possible that our start RT measurements were also contaminated by global 
fluctuations (e.g. if subjects only gambled when they were focused or motivated, start RT 
should be shorter after a gamble than after a non-gamble). To control for such global effects, 
we analyzed the ‘trial n minus trial n-1’ difference. For this analysis, we excluded all trials 
that were excluded in the main analyses, plus trials for which the absolute start RT 
difference with the previous trial was larger than 5 seconds (we included them in the main 
analyses above to boost the trial numbers). The difference score analysis showed that the 
start RT difference was negative (indicating shorter latencies) after a gambled loss (M = -72 
ms, 95% CI: -85/-58), close to zero after a gambled win (M = 2 ms, 95% CI: -12/16), and 
positive after a non-gamble (M = 16 ms, 95% CI: 9/24). The ‘gambled loss vs. gambled win’ 
and the ‘gambled loss vs. non-gamble’ differences were both statistically significant; t(179) = 
6.74, p < .001, gav = .78, BF = 3.18 x 107, and t(179) = -9.23, p < .001, gav = 1.21, BF = 7.12 x 
1013, respectively. Thus, the sequential effect of losses on start RTs is not due to global 
fluctuations. The ‘gambled win vs. non-gamble’ difference was not significant, t(179) = 1.54, 
p = .13, gav = .19, BF = 0.27.
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Overview of the choice analyses
For completeness, we also analyzed how the probability of gambling and the latency of 
the choice response were influenced by the outcome of the previous trial. In Appendices C 
and D, we present the descriptive and inferential statistics for each individual experiment. In 
this section, we will focus on the combined analysis only. 
Probability of gambling in Experiments 1-5
We combined the p(gamble) data of all experiments to establish whether both the post-
reinforcement effect (decreased gambling after a win) and loss chasing (increased gambling 
after a loss) influenced the probability of gambling. Note that we excluded the rating trials of 
Experiment 2 from this combined analysis because analyses had revealed that the ratings 
influenced subsequent performance (see Appendix C).
P(gamble) was lowest after a gambled win (M = .44, SD = .20), intermediate after a 
non-gamble (M = .48, SD = .20), and highest after a gambled loss (M = .51, SD = .19). All 
differences were statistically significant (Table 4). In sum, both post-reinforcement effects 
and loss chasing influenced choice in our gambling task (although the effect sizes reported 
in Table 4 and Appendix C indicate that the loss chasing effect was relatively small; 
furthermore, the Bayesian analysis of the ‘non-gamble vs gambled loss’ difference only 
provided anecdotal support for the alternative hypothesis).
Choice RT in Experiments 1-5 
After both options (i.e. the non-gamble option and the gamble option) had been 
presented separately, subjects saw them again together (one on the left and one on the right 
of the screen). At this point, they could choose one option by pressing the left- or right-arrow 
key of the keyboard for the left or right option, respectively (Figure 1). Here we examined 
whether the latency of the choice responses (choice RT) were influenced by the outcome of 
the previous trial.
Choice RT was shortest after a gambled loss (M = 698 ms, SD = 215 ms), intermediate 
after a non-gamble (M = 713 ms, SD = 227), and longest after a gambled win (M = 731 ms, 
SD = 239). All individual differences were statistically significant (Table 4). The difference 
between gambled losses and non-gambles is consistent with the start RT differences 
reported in the main manuscript. However, choice RT was longer after a gambled win than 
after a non-gamble, whereas start RT was shorter after a gambled win than after a non-
gamble.
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Table 4: Overview of the combined analysis to explore the effect of the previous gamble on choice 
data.
General Discussion
The present study explored the effects of winning and losing on impulsive action. Work 
in various domains indicates that people slow down after errors, conflict, or suboptimal 
outcomes. In other words, they become more cautious. Such sequential effects have been 
attributed to changes in cognitive control settings. The cognitive control account predicted 
that response latencies should increase after a gambled loss compared with a non-gambling 
baseline or a gambled win in our gambling task. However, in all experiments, start RT was 
shorter after a gambled loss than after a gambled win or a non-gamble. These findings are 
inconsistent with the idea that people become more cautious after a loss; instead, they 
indicate that losses in a gambling task can induce impulsive actions4. Furthermore, the 
results of Experiment 4 and the similar (albeit smaller) effects on choice RTs in the gambling 
task (see ‘Overview of the choice analyses’) indicate that loss-induced impulsivity does not 
only influence task-unspecific responses (i.e. the start response, for which there is no correct 
or incorrect response) but also task-specific responses (i.e. the choice response in the 
perceptual-decision-making task and the choice response in the gambling task). In other 
words, losses seem to have a general effect on actions. 
In Experiments 1 and 3, start RT was also significantly shorter after a gambled win than 
after a non-gamble (similar numerical trends were observed in Experiment 2 and in the 
neutral tasks of Experiments 4 and 5). This suggests that start RT is generally faster after a 
previous gamble than after a non-gamble, although it should be noted that the overall 
numerical difference between non-gambles and gambled wins was not significant when we 
controlled for global fluctuations (see above).
P(gamble)
Choice latency
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
diff
-.029
.044
.073
14
-18
-32
lower 
CI
-.052
.067
.049
3
-32
-45
upper 
CI
-.005
.067
.096
26
-4
-20
t
2.434
3.725
6.149
2.499
2.486
4.950
p
.016
< .001
< .001
.013
.014
< .001
gav
.149
.217
.370
.065
.078
.143
BF
1.47
60.12
6.77 x 106
1.71
1.66
6833
4 Extra analyses (also presented in Supplementary Materials) revealed that gambling per se is not an 
impulsive action: For many subjects, the latency of the choice response (to gamble or not) was longer 
for gambles than for non-gambles for many subjects.  
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Affective consequences of gambling and negative outcomes
Our findings are inconsistent with popular cognitive control accounts; instead, they 
suggest emotional influences on action control. Affect has multiple dimensions or 
components that can be influenced by the outcome of a gamble, including affective valence 
and motivational intensity. 
Ratings obtained in Experiment 2 suggest that a gambled win induces positive affect, 
whereas a gambled loss induces negative affect. Negative affect after a loss could reflect 
frustration, regret, or disappointment. Frustration refers to a strong negative affective state 
that is induced by a failure to obtain an incentive or the blockage of a desired goal. 
Disappointment refers to the realization that the outcome is worse than expected or hoped 
for (e.g. the amount associated with the the gamble option is 60 points, but the outcome is 0 
points), whereas regret5 refers to the realization that another choice (i.e. not gambling in our 
task) would have produced a better outcome (e.g. 30 points). Such negative affective states 
can modulate motivational intensity. Previous work suggests that subsequent behavior is 
energized (Amsel, 1958, 1992; Carver 2006; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Mikulincer 
1988) and approach tendencies are intensified (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 
2013) in an attempt to overcome frustration. For example, Amsel (1958) placed hungry rats 
in a box that consisted of two runways in which the rats expected to find food. He observed 
that rats ran faster in the second runway when they did not find the expected food in the first 
runway. He labeled this the ‘frustration effect’ (Amsel, 1958, 1992). Similarly, a recent study 
showed that rats consumed their food faster after they had experienced ‘regret’ compared 
with a control condition (Steiner & Redish, 2014). 
The start RT results of the present study are consistent with the idea that negative 
outcomes can increase motivational intensity and approach behavior. In our task, each trial 
started with the presentation of a certain amount of points, and subjects could lose these 
points when they gambled. In other words, a gambled loss (i.e. outcome = 0 points) in our 
task is a negative event. Therefore, the shorter start RTs (and choice RTs) after a loss 
compared with the non-gambling baseline indicate that negative affect can induce faster 
responses (i.e. impulsive actions). Note that findings of the combined analyses (Figure 2) 
suggests that a failure to obtain a large reward (i.e. when p(win) was low) had a stronger 
effect on start RT than a failure to obtain a smaller reward (i.e. when p(win) was high). This 
5 Some have argued that regret is a special (cognitive) form of frustration (Reid, 1986).
27
suggests that start RT was modulated by frustration or the disappointment of not obtaining 
the larger amount of the gamble. 
Many theories assume that affective states facilitate actions and induce impulsivity (e.g. 
Cyder & Smith, 2008; Frijda, Ridderinkhof, & Rietveld, 2014). Positive affect is typically 
associated with approach behavior, whereas negative affect is typically associated with 
avoidance behavior (Braver et al., 2014). Thus, increased impulsivity or approach behavior 
after negative events may seem counter-intuitive. However, it could be functionally relevant. 
Quickly continuing the game after a gambled loss may help to escape or relieve the negative 
affective state (see also e.g. Billieux et al., 2010;  Cyder & Smith, 2008). It may also help to 
close the gap between the current state (no reward) and the desired state (a reward) (cf. 
Braver et al., 2014). 
Work in other control domains also suggests that emotional and motivational influences 
can modulate sequential effects (although not necessarily in the same way as in the present 
study). For example, in Stroop and flanker tasks, conflict resolution and between-trial 
adaptations are enhanced when an ‘avoidance’ response or state is induced (Schouppe, De 
Houwer, Ridderinkhof, & Notebaert, 2012; Hengstler, Holland, van Steenbergen, & van 
Knippenberg, 2014). By contrast, conflict adaptations are reduced when reward is delivered 
(e.g. van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). More generally, some have argued that 
conflict or errors could be construed as aversive events that are to be avoided in the future 
(Botvinick 2007; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). This aversive signal 
could then lead to adjustments in behavior. Thus, motivation and emotion can influence 
sequential control adjustments in conflict tasks. This conclusion is generally consistent with 
the findings of the present study. However, in the case of conflict and errors, these 
adjustments lead to response slowing (i.e. avoidance behavior), whereas we observed 
increased impulsivity (i.e. approach behavior) after a negative outcome. In other words, the 
nature of the affect plays a critical role. 
Probability of gambling
The combined analysis revealed that p(gamble) was higher after a gambled loss than 
after a non-gamble, and lowest after a gambled win. Again, this pattern is inconsistent with 
the idea that people become more cautious after a loss. However, our p(gamble) results are 
consistent with previous studies (see the Introduction), and support the idea that subjective 
value or utility of options is context-dependent and highly malleable (Stewart, Reimers, & 
Harris, 2015; Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & Brown, 2011). For example, several models of 
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decision-making assume that the subjective value of an option depends on immediately 
preceding gains and losses (for a short review, see Smith et al., 2009). Reduced gambling 
after a gambled win (especially after a large win) and increased gambling after a loss is 
consistent with this idea.
The p(gamble) results of the present study are also consistent with the idea that 
affective components can modulate decision-making. Emotion-based theories of decision 
making propose that emotional states and feelings about expected outcomes influence 
choice (for reviews, see Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; 
Mellers & McGraw, 2001). Consistent with this idea, Campbell-Meiklejohn, Woolrich, 
Passingham, and Rogers (2008) found in an fMRI study that decisions to quit gambling were 
associated with increased activation of brain regions associated with the anticipation of 
negative events. By contrast, loss chasing was associated with activation of brain regions 
often linked to reward processing, appetitive states, and the experience of urges and 
cravings (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008, 2011). Emotion-based theories of decision 
making could explain why people gamble less after a gambled win than after a non-gamble 
in our task: After a gambled win, people are in a positive affective state, and the anticipatory 
disappointment and regret associated with a loss may steer them away from gambling 
again. Positive feelings may also induce ‘coasting’ (Carver, 2003), reducing further gambling 
efforts. By contrast, engaging in a gamble after a loss may reduce the aversive 
consequences of the loss. 
Thus, wins and losses influenced both impulsive action and choice in our task. But were 
these effects on action and choice related? An extra analysis revealed that the ‘gambled loss 
vs. gambled win’ start RT difference did not correlate with the ‘gambled loss vs. gambled 
win’ p(gamble) difference, r(179) = -.05, p = .523. This (partial) dissociation between 
impulsive action (start RT) and choice (p(gamble)) suggests that outcomes of a gamble can 
have distinct effects on motivational intensity and affective valence. More generally, it is 
consistent with the idea that expression of behavior involves two components, namely what 
to do and how vigorously to do it (Guitart-Masip, Beierholm, Dolan, Duzel, & Dayan, 2011; 
see also Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). In many situations, these components are 
tightly coupled, but clinical, cognitive and neuroscience research indicates that they can be 
dissociated (Berridge et al., 2009). The results of the present study may be another example 
of such a dissociation.
Finally, the analyses of the individual experiments (Appendix C) revealed another 
interesting finding. Experiment 2 suggests that encouraging subjects to pause and reflect 
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influenced their subsequent gambling behavior: compared with the non-gambling baseline, 
p(gamble) decreased after a loss on rating trials; by contrast, there was a small (numerical) 
increase on no-rating trials (Appendix C). This is consistent with previous studies that 
showed that presenting feedback and encouraging subjects to reflect on their choices 
influences subsequent decision-making (Brand 2008; Corr & Thompson, 2014). The findings 
of Experiment 4 further show that simply interrupting the flow of the gambling task is not 
sufficient. In this experiment, the outcome of a gamble influenced choice on the next 
gambling trial even when subjects had to perform an unrelated task between the two 
successive gambles. In other words, unless people are encouraged to reflect, interrupting 
the game does not seem to modulate the effect of trial outcome on p(gamble) much. 
However, the additional rating analyses for Experiment 2 suggest that the beneficial effect of 
reflecting on the outcome may be counteracted by fallacious beliefs, as p(gamble) increased 
after a loss when subjects thought that their chances of winning had increased (Appendix 
C). This finding could be important for clinical applications, as it suggests that merely 
introducing a ‘pause for reflection’ may not be sufficient for reducing possible harmful effects 
of gambling in people with gambling-related problems unless cognitive biases are also 
corrected. 
Alternative explanations
We attributed shorter start RTs after a gambled loss to the affective consequences of 
gambling. Based on our findings, we can rule out several alternative explanations. 
First, we can rule out that the start RT pattern was due to expectancy violations. 
Previous work indicates that unexpected events can slow responding (e.g. Leiva, 
Parmentier, Elchlepp, & Verbruggen, 2015; Notebaert et al., 2009). When p(win) of the 
gamble option was .25, subjects could expect a loss when they selected the gamble (and a 
gambled win was unexpected); by contrast, when p(win) of the gamble option was .67, 
subjects could expect a win when they selected the gamble (and a loss was unexpected). 
Figure 3 shows that p(win) and the associated amount of the gamble influenced the start RT 
after a gambled loss but not after a gambled win. Furthermore, start RTs were longest after 
the most predictable outcome (i.e. the non-gamble). Consequently, it seems highly unlikely 
that the overall start RT pattern (start RT gambled loss < start RT gambled win < start RT 
non-gamble) was due to expectancy violations. 
Second, we can rule out the possibility that the start RT pattern (shorter RTs for 
gambled losses than for non-gambles and gambled wins) was due to differences in 
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feedback complexity. Processing complex feedback may slow responding on subsequent 
trials. However, the difference between ‘low p(win)/high amount’ losses and ‘high p(win)/low 
amount’ losses (Figure 2) is inconsistent with a feedback-complexity account. After all, the 
exact same feedback message was presented on both trial types (i.e. ‘outcome = 0 points’). 
Furthermore, we propose that processing the feedback was most straightforward on non-
gambling trials because subjects already knew the outcome of the trial before the feedback 
was presented. Finally, in an extra analysis (not shown), we excluded trials that followed a 
trial on which the guaranteed amount associated with the non-gambling option was 30 or 40. 
As shown in Appendix A, these amounts were occasionally awarded on gamble trials as 
well. Thus, presenting these amounts after a non-gamble could have induced some conflict 
(assuming that these amounts were associated with gambling). However, the extra analyses 
revealed that start RT was still shorter after a loss than after a non-gamble (p < .001) or a 
gambled win (p < .001) when these trials were excluded. Thus, we can rule out a feedback-
complexity account. 
Third, we used non-gambling trials as a baseline to determine if gambled losses 
induced impulsive actions or if gambled wins induced cautious actions. But subjects still 
received some points when they did not gamble. In other words, it could be argued that the 
non-gambled trials were similar to gambled wins. Consequently, the start RT pattern could 
reflect a post-reinforcement pause (i.e. slower responding after the delivery of a reward), 
rather than a loss-induced impulsivity effect. However, the ratings in Experiment 2 indicate 
that non-gambles were treated differently to gambled wins. Furthermore, the post-
reinforcement pause account predicts that start latencies should increase as a function of 
the magnitude of the reward (Dixon et al., 2012). By contrast, we found that start latencies 
were longer after a non-gamble (lower amounts) than after a gambled win (higher amounts). 
Finally, the results depicted in Figure 2 suggest that the start RT pattern is largely due to 
losses encouraging faster responses (rather than wins encouraging slower responses). 
Negative urgency
The present study focused on ‘state’ impulsivity (i.e. transient changes in action 
control). However, Figure 3 shows that there were large individual differences. How people 
respond to a loss could be influenced by various personality traits. Trait impulsivity is a 
multifaceted construct. Several studies indicate that acting impulsively in response to 
negative events (‘negative urgency’ trait) can be dissociated from other impulsivity traits 
(Cyders & Smith, 2008). Importantly, negative urgency or mood-based rash action can be 
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associated with various behavioral addictions (including gambling; Billieux et al., 2012; 
Michalczuk, Bowden-Jones, Verdejo-Garcia, & Clark, 2011) substance-use disorders, and 
risk taking (Settles et al., 2012). Thus, how people respond to emotional events is clinically 
relevant. 
Figure 3: The start RT difference between trials following a gambled loss and trials following a non-
gambling (i.e. the baseline) for each individual (total N = 180; the X-axis shows ‘experimental 
subject’). Negative values indicate loss-induced impulsivity. 
We propose that our task measured negative urgency-like states. It could be interesting 
to link state- and trait impulsivity. For example, Gipson et al. (2012) found that subjects 
scoring high in negative urgency showed increased response vigor (indicated by the number 
of mouse clicks executed to obtain a new reward) and increased frustration following 
unexpected reward omission compared to subjects low in negative urgency. In the present 
study, we did not include self-report questionnaires. Therefore, a future goal of our research 
program is to further explore individual differences in our paradigm, and examine how these 
are related to personality traits such as negative urgency.
Conclusions
Research on gambling challenges many psychological and economic models of decision 
making and human behavior (Clark et al., 2014). In these models, humans are often 
portrayed as rational beings who learn from their mistakes and optimize their behavior. In the 
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present study, we explored how people adjust behavior after they have lost a gamble. We 
found that that gambled losses induced impulsive actions. Furthermore, we observed 
reduced risk-taking after a win but increased risk-taking after a loss. In sum, we found only 
limited support for the idea that people increase control settings after a negative outcome in 
gambling tasks. Instead, our results indicate that emotional and motivational factors largely 
determine how people respond to losses in a gambling task.
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Appendix A
Overview of the different combinations of options in the experiments (16 in total). Each 
combination occurred with equal probability. 
•  Expected value = 20: 
‒ 100% certain to win 20 vs. 66% certain to win 30
‒ 100% certain to win 20 vs. 50% certain to win 40
‒ 100% certain to win 20 vs. 33% certain to win 60
‒ 100% certain to win 20 vs. 25% certain to win 80
• Expected value = 30: 
‒ 100% certain to win 30 vs. 66% certain to win 45
‒ 100% certain to win 30 vs. 50% certain to win 60
‒ 100% certain to win 30 vs. 33% certain to win 90
‒ 100% certain to win 30 vs. 25% certain to win 120
• Expected value = 40: 
‒ 100% certain to win 40 vs. 66% certain to win 60
‒ 100% certain to win 40 vs. 50% certain to win 80
‒ 100% certain to win 40 vs. 33% certain to win 80
‒ 100% certain to win 40 vs. 25% certain to win 160
• Expected value = 50: 
‒ 100% certain to win 50 vs. 66% certain to win 75
‒ 100% certain to win 50 vs. 50% certain to win 100
‒ 100% certain to win 50 vs. 33% certain to win 150
‒ 100% certain to win 50 vs. 25% certain to win 200
43
Appendix B: Overview of univariate analyses
Table B1: Overview of univariate analyses to explore the effect of the previous gamble on the start 
RT of the current gambling trial in Experiments 1-5. 
Table B2: To further explore the correlation between performance and the ratings, we analyzed start 
RT using a 3 (outcome previous trial: non-gamble, gambled loss, gambled win) by 2 (rating: rating ≤ 
median vs. rating > median) repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Table B3: Overview of univariate analyses to explore the effect of the previous gamble on 
performance in the perceptual decision-making (PDM) task of Experiment 4 and the go task in 
Experiment 5.
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Outcome trial n-1
Casino Alternation (CA)
Outcome by CA
Df1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
Df2
38
78
78
39
78
78
78
SS1
337735
90207
1080000
63800
18
132183
15412
SS2
179253
299992
1848854
1298828
1212027
237340
385935
F
35.798
11.727
22.800
1.910
0.001
21.720
1.557
p
< .001
< .001
< .001
.174
.999
< .001
.217
η2gen
0.153
0.036
0.083
0.005
0.000
0.044
0.002
‘Pleased with ouctome’ 
‘Increased chances of winning’
Outcome trial n-1
Rating Split
Outcome:Rating Split
Outcome trial n-1
Rating Split
Outcome:Rating Split
Df1
2
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
66
33
66
66
33
66
SS1
275878
2917
11304
259152
9990
11494
SS2
746990
304939
367909
725899
255436
369234
F
12.188
0.316
1.014
11.781
1.291
1.027
p
< .001
.578
.368
< .001
.264
.364
η2gen
0.050
0.001
0.002
0.048
0.002
0.002
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Start RT
Go acc 
Go RT
Start RT
Go acc 
Go RT
Df1
2
2
2
2
2
2
Df2
78
78
78
78
78
78
SS1
433299
0.004
49764
346073
0.016
4681
SS2
417553
0.369
298442
620776
0.144
104288
F
40.471
0.467
6.503
21.742
4.233
1.751
p
< .001
.629
.002
< .001
.018
.180
η2gen
0.101
0.006
0.012
0.036
0.027
0.001
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Appendix C: Probability of gambling in Experiments 1-5
The combined analysis reported in the main manuscript indicates that subjects 
gambled less after a gambled win than after a non-gamble, and that the probability of 
gambling was highest after a gambled loss. The p(gamble) analyses for each individual 
experiment revealed similar numerical differences (Table C1), but the paired t-tests were not 
always significant (Table C2).
For Experiment 2, we also performed a median-split analysis (see the main manuscript 
for further details). The results are presented in Tables C4-C5. P(gamble) was generally 
lower for trials with a higher ‘pleased with outcome’ rating than for trials with a lower rating, 
suggesting that the decision to gamble is influenced by hedonic state. The ‘increased 
chances of winning’ analysis revealed a significant interaction between the outcome of the 
previous trial and the ‘increased chance of winning’ rating. After a loss, probability of 
gambling was higher for high-rating trials than for low rating trials; this difference was 
statistically significant, p = .008, and suggests a cognitive influence on the probability of 
gambling. For trials following a non-gamble or a gambled win, the numerical p(gamble) 
differences between low- and high-rating trials were not significant (both ps > .47).
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Table C1: Overview of probability of gambling for Experiments 1-5 as a function of the outcome of the 
last gambling trial. Note that in Experiments 4 and 5, subjects performed a non-gambling task 
between two successive gambling trials. 
Table C2: Overview of planned comparisons to explore the effect of the previous gamble on 
probability of gambling in Experiments 1-5. Experiment 1, df = 19; Experiments 2-5, df = 39.
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
No rating
Rating
Casino Repetition
Casino Alternation
Non-gamble
M
.517
.511
.518
.443
.439
.458
.492
sd
.159
.213
.226
.221
.227
.204
.178
Loss
M
.529
.517
.457
.505
.505
.483
.521
sd
.166
.210
.212
.190
.194
.186
.186
Gambled Win
M
.452
.444
.457
.409
.427
.412
.462
sd
.188
.240
.231
.222
.221
.192
.191
Experiment 1
Experiment 2: no rating
Experiment 2: rating
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
diff
-0.011
0.065
0.076
-0.006
0.067
0.073
0.061
0.062
0.001
-0.064
0.023
0.087
-0.026
0.045
0.071
-0.029
0.030
0.059
lower 
CI
-0.084
0.003
0.013
-0.066
0.004
0.012
0.006
-0.010
-0.055
-0.115
-0.032
0.033
-0.072
0.002
0.022
-0.075
-0.012
0.015
upper 
CI
0.061
0.128
0.14
0.054
0.129
0.134
0.115
0.133
0.057
-0.013
0.079
0.141
0.021
0.089
0.121
0.017
0.073
0.103
t
-0.325
2.187
2.52
-0.210
2.168
2.418
2.265
1.746
0.032
-2.537
0.842
3.244
-1.113
2.136
2.913
-1.257
1.444
2.703
p
.749
.041
.021
.835
.036
.020
.029
.089
.975
.015
.405
.002
.272
.039
.006
.216
.157
.010
gav
0.068
0.368
0.423
0.029
0.292
0.322
0.275
0.267
0.004
0.314
0.109
0.448
0.131
0.228
0.374
0.156
0.162
0.310
BF
0.24
1.61
2.79
0.17
1.39
2.23
1.66
0.68
0.17
2.84
0.24
13.96
0.30
1.31
6.42
0.35
0.44
4.04
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Table C3: Overview of univariate analyses to explore the effect of the previous gamble on p(gamble) 
on the current gambling trial in Experiments 1-5. 
Table C4: Overview of the probability of gambling as a function of the median split (rating is ≤ median 
rating or > median rating) and the preceding gambling trial in Experiment 2. (Standard deviation 
between brackets).
Table C5: To further explore the correlation between performance and the ratings, we analyzed 
p(gamble) using a 3 (outcome previous trial: non-gamble, gambled loss, gambled win) by 2 (rating: 
rating ≤ median vs. rating > median) repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Outcome trial n-1
Rating
Outcome:Rating
Outcome trial n-1
Casino Alternation (CA)
Outcome by CA
Df1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
Df2
38
78
39
78
78
39
78
78
78
SS1
0.068
0.166
0.011
0.065
0.324
0.001
0.006
0.104
0.069
SS2
0.382
2.205
0.238
0.641
2.186
0.525
0.589
0.823
0.745
F
3.396
2.943
1.768
3.945
5.775
0.094
0.370
4.925
3.630
p
.044
.059
.191
.023
.005
.761
.692
.010
.031
η2gen
0.039
0.014
0.001
0.006
0.030
0.000
0.001
0.023
0.017
‘I was pleased with the outcome of 
the previous trial’ 
‘I think my chances of winning on 
the next trial have increased’
non-gamble
≤ Md
.59 
(.21)
.56
(.22)
> Md
.55 
(.21)
.58
(.20)
Loss
≤ Md
.51 
(.22)
.47
(.21)
> Md
.49 
(.20)
.54
(.20)
Gambled win
≤ Md
.54 
(.22)
.53
(.21)
> Md
.49 
(.21)
.50
(.22)
‘Pleased with outcome’ 
‘Increased chances of winning’
Outcome trial n-1
Rating Split
Outcome:Rating Split
Outcome trial n-1
Rating Split
Outcome:Rating Split
Df1
2
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
66
33
66
66
33
66
SS1
0.175
0.061
0.005
0.167
0.030
0.087
SS2
2.674
0.482
0.964
2.640
0.561
0.806
F
2.164
4.164
0.160
2.093
1.740
3.548
p
.123
.049
.853
.131
.196
.034
η2gen
0.019
0.007
0.001
0.019
0.003
0.010
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Appendix D: Choice latencies in Experiments 1-5
Table D1: Overview of choice latencies for Experiments 1-5 as a function of the outcome of the last 
gambling trial. Note that in Experiments 4 and 5, subjects performed a non-gambling task between 
two successive gambling trials. 
Table D2: Overview of planned comparisons to explore the effect of the previous gamble on choice 
latencies in Experiments 1-5. Experiment 1, df = 19; Experiments 2-5, df = 39.
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
No rating
Rating
Casino Repetition
Casino Alternation
Non-gamble
M
687
974
980
662
653
621
612
sd
135
259
258
137
123
137
185
Loss
M
672
939
913
664
654
605
603
sd
134
229
228
168
148
130
178
Gambled Win
M
706
996
993
670
678
636
626
sd
150
273
285
147
160
139
198
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
Non-gamble vs Gambled loss
Non-gamble vs Gambled win
Gambled loss vs Gambled win
diff
15
-19
-34
50
-17
-68
-1
-17
-16
16
-15
-31
8
-14
-22
lower
CI
-7
-53
-64
18
-56
-102
-28
-45
-36
0
-33
-54
-8
-33
-43
upper
CI
37
14
-4
83
21
-34
25
12
5
33
4
-8
24
5
-1
t
1.434
-1.209
-2.411
3.115
-0.922
-4.005
-0.105
-1.201
-1.498
2.031
-1.620
-2.775
1.029
-1.501
-2.148
p
.168
.242
.026
.003
.362
< .001
.917
.237
.142
.049
.113
.008
.310
.141
.038
gav
0.108
0.132
0.235
0.209
0.067
0.276
0.010
0.123
0.104
0.121
0.106
0.230
0.045
0.072
0.117
BF
0.56
0.44
2.32
10.26
0.25
98.86
0.17
0.33
0.48
1.08
0.56
4.72
0.28
0.48
1.34
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Table D3: Overview of univariate analyses to explore the effect of the previous gamble on choice 
latencies on the current gambling trial in Experiments 1-5. 
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
Experiment 3
Experiment 4
Experiment 5
Outcome trial n-1
Rating
Outcome:Rating
Outcome trial n-1
Casino Alternation (CA)
Outcome by CA
Df1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
Df2
38
78
39
78
78
39
78
78
78
SS1
11686
199349
3474
10838
14065
920
4329
19523
6740
SS2
71002
947225
351239
604614
494790
110577
372294
143366
161370
F
3.127
8.208
0.386
0.699
1.109
0.324
0.454
5.311
1.629
p
.055
.001
.538
.500
.335
.572
.637
.007
.203
η2gen
0.010
0.013
0.000
0.001
0.003
0.000
0.001
0.009
0.002
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Winning and losing: Effects on impulsive action
Individual differences in choice RT.
Choice RT was shorter for trials on which subjects selected non-gamble (M = 706 ms, 
SD = 223) than for trials on which subjects selected the gamble option (M = 738 ms, SD = 
248), t(179) = 3.650, p < .001, gav = 0.132. However, we observed large individual 
differences (Figure S1).
RT(g) < RT(ng)
RT(g) > RT(ng)
r = −.62, p < .001
0.0
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Figure S1: Correlation between overall probability of gambling and the normalized choice RT 
difference. RT difference = (choice RT gamble minus choice RT non-gamble)/(choice RT non-
gamble).
For each subject, we calculated a normalized RT difference score: (choice RT gamble 
minus choice RT non-gamble)/(choice RT non-gamble). Thus, a negative score indicates 
that the subject selects the gamble proportionally faster than the non-gamble. As can be 
seen in Figure S1, selecting the gamble took longer than selecting the non-gamble for many 
subjects (i.e. many data points are above the horizontal dashed line). Interestingly, this 
50
latency difference correlated strongly with overall p(gamble): the less subjects gambled, the 
longer it took them to select the gamble compared with selecting the non-gamble, r(179) = -.
62, p < .001 (coefficient robust regression: value =  -0.4202,  standard error = 0.0391, t(178) 
= 10.742).
The pattern in Figure S1 is inconsistent with the idea that the decision to gamble is 
always a rash decision or an impulsive act (see also e.g. Losecaat Vermeer, Boksem, & 
Sanfey, 2014). Stochastic accumulator models of decision making (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004) 
can offer a parsimonious explanation for the correlation between the choice RT and 
probability of gambling. Such models assume that decision making involves the 
accumulation of noisy information until there is enough support for a specific option. The 
main parameters of the selection process are the response criteria (i.e., how much 
information is required for an option to be selected), accumulation rate (i.e., how quickly 
does evidence accumulate), and the starting point (i.e. a priori bias against one or the other 
choice alternatives; Figure S2). The correlation between p(gamble) and choice RT can be 
explained by individual differences in the starting point: when subjects have a bias against 
gambling (i.e. they are ‘gambling-averse’), the distance between the starting point and the 
‘gambling’ boundary will be larger than the distance between the starting point and the non-
gambling boundary (Figure S2, right panel). Consequently, the gambling option will be 
selected less frequently because the accumulated evidence in favor of it is less likely to 
reach the gambling boundary first. Furthermore, if the gambling boundary is reached after 
all, the latency of the gambling response will be (on average) longer than the latency of non-
gambling responses (Figure S2, right panel). Thus, risk preference can be captured by 
individual differences in the starting point. 
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Figure S2: A bias in the starting point (Z) of a sequential decision-making process can explain both 
the overall probability of gambling and latency differences. The left panel reflects a hypothetical 
‘gambling-neutral’ subject; the right panel reflects a hypothetical ‘gambling-averse’ subject.
Does the rating influence start RT of the next trial in Experiment 2?
The p(gamble) analysis for Experiment 2 suggests that the ratings induced a reflective 
mode: compared with the non-gambling baseline, p(gamble) after a loss decreased on rating 
trials, but increased (slightly) on no-rating trials. 
Here we explored if the ratings also influenced start RT on the next trial (note that the 
statements were presented after subjects had pressed the start key, so ratings could not 
influence start RT of the current trial). The results are presented in Figure S3. There was a 
significant main effect of trial outcome, F(2,78) = 11.532, p < .001. The main effect of rating 
on the previous trial, F(1,39) = 1.223, p = .276, and the interaction, F(2,78) = 2.234, p = .114, 
were not significant. Thus, ratings did not influence start RT much. 
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Figure S3: Start RT as a function of the outcome of the previous trial and rating properties of the 
previous trial (no-rating trial vs. rating trial). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Does the outcome of the non-gambling task influence start RT and p(gamble) on the 
next trial in Experiments 4 and 5? 
In Experiment 4, the outcome of the immediately preceding perceptual decision-making 
trial (trial n-1) influenced performance in the gambling task: subjects started the next 
gambling trial sooner after an incorrect perceptual decision-making trial (M = 541 ms; SD = 
149) than after a correct trial (M = 576; SD = 165), t(39) = 2.326, p = 0.025, gav = .223. This 
suggests that a negative outcome in difficult perceptual decision-making tasks can also have 
an ‘energizing’ effect on behavior (see also e.g. Mikulincer 1988). Choice latencies in the 
gambling task were also numerically shorter after an incorrect trial (M = 613 ms; SD = 131 
ms) than after an correct trial (M= 621 ms; SD= 133), but this difference was not statistically 
significant; t(39) = 1.402, p = .169, gav = .059. These findings seem inconsistent with 
previous studies that found post-error slowing. It is possible that the switch design 
discouraged subjects from making post-error adjustments. However, subjects gambled less 
after an incorrect perceptual decision-making trial (p(gamble)= .43; SD = .18) than after a 
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correct trial (p(gamble)= .46; SD = .18); t(39) = 2.357, p = .024, gav = .153. Thus, error 
processing in the perceptual decision-making task may have had some influence on choice 
in the gambling task.
In Experiment 5, subjects alternated between the gambling task and a stop-signal task. 
The outcome of the immediately preceding stop-signal trial (trial n-1: correct go response, 
successful stop, unsuccessful stop) did not influence performance in the gambling task 
much. Subjects started the next gambling trial later after a failed stop (M = 779 ms; SD = 
347) than after a successful stop (M = 741 ms; SD = 209) or a correct go (M = 725 ms; SD = 
242), but these differences were not statistically significant (Table S1). Nevertheless, the 
numerical trends are consistent with the idea that subjects increased the priority of the stop 
goal after a signal trial (Bissett & Logan, 2011), and this could have counteracted the 
affective consequences of a negative outcome.
Table S1 shows that p(gamble) were similar for trials that followed a correct go (M = .
49; SD = .17), a successful stop (M = .51; SD = .18), or an unsuccessful stop (M = .48; SD 
= .19), replicating our previous findings (Stevens et al., 2015). Choice latencies were also 
similar for trials that followed a correct go (M = 606 ms; SD = 185), a successful stop (M= 
624 ms; SD = 199), or an unsuccessful stop (M = 616 ms; SD = 190). 
Table S1: Overview of planned comparisons to explore the effect of the previous stop-signal trial on 
performance in the gambling task in Experiment 5. Uncorrected p-values are shown. For all 
comparisons, df = 39.
Note: correct = trials preceded by a correct go (no-signal) trial, SR = trials preceded by a failed stop 
trial (signal-respond), SI = trials preceded by a successful stop trial (signal-inhibit).
Start RT
P(gamble)
Choice RT
Correct vs SR
Correct vs SI
SI vs SR
Correct vs SR
Correct vs SI
SI vs SR
Correct vs SR
Correct vs SI
SI vs SR
diff
-55
-17
38
0.014
-0.02
-0.035
-10
-18
-8
lower CI
-122
-67
-37
-0.018
-0.054
-0.075
-30
-37
-31
upper CI
13
34
112
0.047
0.013
0.006
9
1
15
t
-1.639
-0.668
1.030
0.908
-1.232
-1.735
-1.090
-1.965
-0.683
p
0.109
0.508
0.309
0.37
0.225
0.091
0.283
0.057
0.499
gav
0.184
0.073
0.135
0.079
0.116
0.188
0.055
0.094
0.040
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First vs. second half of the experiment
In a final set of analyses, we explored whether the sequential effect of gambling 
changed throughout the experiment. More specifically, we contrasted performance in the first 
and second half of the experiment. To increase power, we combined the data of all five 
experiments again. The relevant descriptive and inferential statistics appear in Tables S2 
and S3, respectively. We will focus on the interaction between Trial Outcome and Part only. 
Trial outcome had a similar effect on start RT and p(gamble) in the first and second half 
of the experiment (ps > .18; Table S3). We observed a marginally significant interaction 
between Trial Outcome and Part in the choice RT analysis (p = .051; Table S3). Table S2 
shows that choice RTs were longer after a gambled win than after a non-gamble only in the 
first half of the experiment. Note that choice RTs were shorter after a gambled loss than after 
a non-gamble in both parts. 
Table S2: Overview of the mean start RT, probability of gambling, and choice RT in the gambling task 
as a function of preceding gambling trial for the first and second part of the experiment (Part 1 vs. Part 
2). The data of Experiments 1-5 are combined.
Table S3: Overview of univariate analyses to explore the effect of the previous gamble on 
performance in the first and second half (Part) of the experiment.
Start RT
P(gamble)
Choice RT
Part 1
Part 2
Part 1
Part 2
Part 1
Part 2
Non-gamble
M
718
582
0.508
0.470
773
662
SD
272
202
0.202
0.223
273
209
Gambled loss
M
625
486
0.515
0.480
743
645
SD
251
202
0.204
0.231
238
213
Gambled win
M
698
544
0.432
0.421
791
663
SD
279
228
0.212
0.247
290
220
Start RT
P(gamble)
Choice RT
Outcome
Part 
Outcome by Part
Outcome
Part 
Outcome by Part
Outcome
Part 
Outcome by Part
Df1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
358
179
358
358
179
358
358
179
358
SS1
1685875
5517873
17357
1.102
0.211
0.041
207625
3387065
38729
SS2
5470311
7565329
3584990
8.688
5.322
4.340
2713423
4263627
2305363
F
55.165
130.556
0.867
22.700
7.093
1.687
13.697
142.199
3.007
p
0.000
0.000
0.421
0.000
0.008
0.186
0.000
0.000
0.051
η2gen
0.026
0.081
0.000
0.021
0.004
0.001
0.003
0.051
0.001
